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Is LAw JusT 'A MEANS To AN END'?
Roger Cotterrell*
This paper examines the claim that law, in complex modern societies,
is merely a tool or instrument of private, sectional or governmental
purposes. To put matters in perspective, it considers ways in which
shared tradiions,common values, emotional allegiances and convergent
individual interests have been thought, by legal and social theorists, to
be foundations for law - the basis of a 'common good' which law
serves. The paper argues that these theoreticalviews remain instructive.
In contemporary multicultural societies there are diverse social
foundations on which law's authority and effectiveness depend. The
conception of law as 'a means to an end' is not adequate to characterise
these foundations.
In all modern legal systems, lawyers and politicians have become used to
thinking of law as an instrument for achieving chosen purposes - whether these
purposes are chosen by government (as public policy) or by citizens, corporations
and groups (as private or sectional interests). The idea has become so familiar
in Western countries that it is often hard to think of an alternative to it.
The American socio-legal scholar, Brian Tamanaha, has recently tried to
show how this idea became established over the past century and a half in the
USA. He contrasts it with what he calls 'non-instrumental' views of law, which
treated law as having inherent values or qualities related to a sense of 'common
good' or an idea of society's natural or moral order. In these non-instrumental
views law had 'a necessary content and integrity' as 'a pre-given order that
encompassed everyone.. .a law for all that was the product of no-one." Tamanaha
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argues that to see law as a mere tool, lacking any inherent worth and serving no
distinctive values that are essential to it, is profoundly dangerous. The idea of
law as 'a means to an end' is not in itself pernicious, he suggests, but it becomes
a threat when detached from any sense of an overall public good. Then, law
becomes a tool of special interests, a weapon to be seized to achieve one's
purposes whatever effects this may have on others.
A threat to the rule of law comes from the breeding of cynicism about law
as a system of ideas, and about the agencies that serve it. If legislatures behave
in ways that suggest that the laws that they make are no more than the enacted
wishes of some partisan group that dominates the nation, respect for law is
undermined. So too, if lawyers act merely as 'hired guns' determinedly promoting
their clients' interests without concern for wider social interests or for the integrity
of the legal system. Worst of all (and Tamanaha thinks this calamity has not yet
happened) is if judges no longer render decisions in an objective fashion based
on law.
Tamanaha ends his book unsure as to whether there is hope for law in the
United States. The evidence could be read to suggest that 'in every legal arena
battles are taking place between groups seeking to seize control of and wield
the law as a weapon in their struggle against other groups'; but, on the other
hand, it might be that, despite everything, 'there remains a core base-line of
consensus over fundamentals within US society and the legal culture. 2 In the
latter case, there is something to build on and what is necessary is for legislators,
government officials and judges to adhere conscientiously to an idea of a common
law expressing a common good. How they are to be persuaded to do so, and
what that common good must be taken to be, are not made clear.
What should we make of this horror story about law, with just the faint
hope of a happy ending? Tamanaha's is an American story but it has resonances
in Britain and, I suspect, in any society which has a vibrant modern economy
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and the restlessly competing private interests that go with this. The flourishing
of a dynamic civil society promotes pressures on the legal system, firstly, to
recognise adequately the range of interests seeking aid and protection from law
and secondly, to adapt itself (on its own juristic and institutional terms) to
facilitate, as efficiently as possible, the pursuit of these interests. A third pressure
may be for law simply to yield to these interests - to become an extension of
them, a direct and dependent agency through which they are pursued. The legal
system cannot, however, become a voice for all special interests without
collapsing into incoherence.
There has to be a set of unifying criteria to govern legal regulation. This is
what Tamanaha means by the 'common good or public interest'.3 But who can
say without controversy what this is? The American jurist Roscoe Pound, in the
first half of the twentieth century, wrestled with the problem of finding ultimate
legal criteria for balancing conflicting interests in modern societies such as his
own.' He called them 'jural postulates' and tried to formulate them at different
times throughout his long career.s In earlier eras, ideas of natural law, natural
rights or social contracts were invoked to suggest value systems that law must
presuppose to give it the integrity and strength to regulate conflicts from a position
that could be thought of as relatively independent of the clash of interests.'
Now, none of these ideas seem adequate. All have an antiquated ring to them.
We sense that social change is too rapid - especially as regards the material
aspects of life - to allow for any fixed and comprehensive value system to
govern contemporary law. Law must learn from experience and change, radically
and rapidly, if it is not to be left behind as irrelevant (avoided, not enforced, or
rendered arbitrary and unpredictable) by technological, commercial and other
developments.
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In any case, is it necessarily ultimate values that are needed to unify law
and prevent it disintegrating into the battleground of private interests? Some
writers would say that law is given its integrity and distinctiveness by tradition.'
Certainly, lawyers are often torn between, on the one hand, a sense of legal
traditions - established ways of working with law which comparative lawyers
often refer to as 'legal style'- and, on the other, a recognition of the importance
of continual adaptability. Some jurists have also suggested that law may
ultimately have a mystical foundation, based in the spirit of the culture it
expresses - something experienced emotionally rather than analysed rationally.
In the nineteenth century, Carl von Savigny's famous use of the Volksgeist (spirit
of the people) idea in trying to specify the unique identity of German law was
an example of this approach.'
In classic socio-legal theory, three sharply contrasting but very influential
approaches explain how a sense of common good can underpin law in modern
conditions. One of these is that of Karl Marx. Marx claimed, as is well known,
that in reality there are no common interests that law serves. Law is always an
instrument of some classes used against others; any idea of common interest
must be a sham. The sense of a common good may exist, but, if so, it is an
ideological device to disguise the reality of class struggle.' For Marxists,
Tamanaha's gloomiest prognosis (the absence of any sense of law as a common
resource to counter its appropriation by sectional interests) simply recognises
what law has been all along - the prize in an endless struggle between opposing
forces. Old non-instrumental ideas of law would be viewed, in Marxist analysis,
as a mass deception which the triumph of the idea of law as a means to an end
has at last exposed.
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The problem is that, whatever truth there may be in this characterisation,
it does not help solve the problem that exists for those who fervently wish law
to be something more than an object of struggle. Tamanaha, for example, insists
that non-instrumental views of law in the past were not a sham. When adopted
by judges and other legal officials, these views 'imposed their own demands.
They conferred benefits upon others unintended by the elite, and regularly
hamstrung those in power who wished to wield the law instrumentally for their
own advantage."' Hence, as the Marxist E. P. Thompson declared, the rule of
law - if taken seriously as a doctrine - is not a bourgeois mystification but 'an
unqualified human good"' because it requires that power be channelled in
predictable ways and so implies that all, to some extent, should benefit from a
degree of predictability about the use of this power.
From a non-Marxist perspective, Max Weber's early twentieth century
sociology of law offered a somewhat related vision - ambivalent, rather than
sceptical - about the idea of a common good that the law serves. For Weber, as
for Tamanaha, law is justified in instrumental terms. Weber was, no doubt,
influenced by his compatriot Rudolf von Jhering, a leading German jurist of
the nineteenth century, whose best-known book is titled, in English translation,
2
Law as a Means to an End.1
Weber saw modern law as having entirely lost what
he called its 'metaphysical dignity' - the fundamental moral justification that
had been sought in natural law ideas. It had become no more than a means of
producing compromises between conflicting interests. 3 He saw the strength of
this law partly in its obvious usefulness as an instrument for this balancing of
demands, but also as a means of steering society bureaucratically by means of
rationally organised rules. Law serves the common good in this view by providing
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a vast network of rules and regulations that make it'possible to organise
immensely complicated modern societies. The common good is, thus, the same
usefulness of law (for citizens, corporations, groups, or governments trying to
steer society) that Tamanaha emphasises.
The downside of all this is that, portrayed in this way, life seems like a cage
made up of legal rules. Is this all there is? Weber writes, his words echoing to us
across the decades, that no absolute values inform law and there is no single
value system that unites modern societies. Life is made up of many different
value spheres, irreconcilable with each other. Hence Weber's ambivalence about
the common good is that, as an ideal, it seems to be a purely materialistic good
defined in terms of everyone pursuing their interests in a well-ordered nation
state. Particular values and ideals may influence law in various ways at various
times. But in Weber's notoriously pessimistic scenario, this will not dent or shift
the edifice of modern law. In other words, while Tamanaha portrays law as
weakened and threatened by legal instrumentalism, Weber presents an opposite
picture of law's instrumental strength.
Weber's thinking surely still has a powerful resonance for contemporary,
globalised, materialistic, and bureaucratic societies. It may reflect a European
view of the state as ultimately a necessary, welcome and powerful regulator by
means of law, as contrasted with an American view that sees law as rooted in
community rather than state and is hence alarmed by suggestions that conflicts
of private interests are undermining the sense of community. But Weber's ideas
also powerfully emphasise that modern instrumental law can have an existence
independent of moral values. Its usefulness is enough to justify it. It has a life
of its own - as pure technical regulation. That means, we might suggest, that all
aspects of it can become a matter of technical calculation. For example, the
possibility of legal liability may be not a matter for shame but merely a transaction
cost. And the application of rules may become a matter of trying to achieve a
result that cannot be criticised for deviation from the rule's terms, rather than
one that is consistent with the rule's reasonable aims. As Emile Durkheim once
put it, law without a moral foundation is law that has no soul.
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Durkheim is the third of the classic socio-legal theorists of law's 'common
good' and the only one of them who searches for a basis of modern law in
ultimate values." For him, law in complex modern societies needs to express
principles of respect for each individual, treated as a human being entitled to
dignity and autonomy as such. The sheer complexity and variety of these societies
is such that only this appeal to irreducible humanity can have universal moral
resonance today. This is a value system that insists on tolerance of difference
between people, their lifestyles and their viewpoints, but it treats each person
as equally human and equally worthy of dignity as such. What is interesting is
that Durkheim sets up this humanistic individualism - today expressed most
obviously in ideas of human rights - in sharp opposition to the sort of egoism
that Tamanaha sees in American law. The morality of modern societies and
their law has to be one that makes the rights of others at least as important as
one's own. It sees the common good in, for example, concern for the loser in
litigation, the convicted offender, or the person who has rights but no realistic
prospect of asserting them. It necessarily seeks to limit the blind pursuit of
private or sectional interests that militates against any sense of the common
good. Litigation cannot be morally justified as an instrument that allows a smash
and grab raid by a plaintiff on a defendant using the court as his agent; nor can
legislation be morally legitimate if it promotes sectional interests with no concern
for social solidarity.
Tamanaha writes about the focus of lawyers on serving private or sectional
interests. However, it is important to emphasise that it is not just individuals
and corporations, but also racial and cultural groups, that seek to promote their
interests through litigation or legislative lobbying. Tamanaha says hardly anything
about the challenges of multiculturalism for law. Yet, these are hugely important
challenges in many countries now, not least India and Britain. Can there be a
common good that prevails over the clash of cultural interests and sectarian
claims from different parts of the nation state? Wil lawyers and legal scholars
who see themselves as representing the interests of particular minority groups
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still recognise an overriding obligation to a sense of common good that law
must express and symbolise? Or must the matter be left to be negotiated endlessly
through the piecemeal, pragmatic, temporary management of conflicts of interest
in courts and legislatures? In such circumstances, law, for each self-identified
ethnic, racial or religious group in a national population, may be just a means to
some group purpose or an obstacle to its achievement.
How should legal analysts view the clash of claims and interests in
multicultural societies? Some may consider, in Weberian manner, that the routine
negotiation of interests by means of law is in itself a sufficiently useful process
to preserve law's status and autonomy. Others may appeal to established legal
traditions to provide a stable framework in which potentially explosive issues
can be narrowed and addressed. From another point of view, the legal system
may need actively to earn and retain allegiance - the sense in the population at
large that it is 'our' legal system for which 'all of us' take responsibility (and not
merely a resource that some can use against others). Finally, seeking Tamanaha's
'common good', we might turn to Durkheim's values of individualism and argue
that these must be consistently promoted. In any case, it is important to stress
that law is notjust a means to an end. It is a means to many ends and the security
of any society will depend on ensuring that the ends of law are the ones that
citizens can together recognise and respect as valid.
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